“The Value of Science is in the Foresight” is an article by Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. It is based on theses of his speech at the annual general assembly of the Russian Academy of Military Science and was published in the Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kurier military journal in early 2013.
In the article, Gerasimov presents his views on the changing nature of warfare in the 21st century. He reflects upon the events of the “Arab Spring” as an example of contemporary military conflict to learn from, ascertains the tendency of increasingly blurred lines between states of war and peace, and emphasizes the increased role of political, economic, informational, humanitarian and other nonmilitary measures as means of warfare. Gerasimov outlines present trends in military theory, in which “frontal engagements of large formations of forces at the strategic and operational level are gradually becoming a thing of the past,” and the attention is shifted towards various forms of unconventional, hybrid, and asymmetric forms of warfare.
As the title and the initial audience suggest, Gerasimov underlines the importance of military science, which in his view, ought to produce high-tech solutions and models of operation that would account for the complex character of contemporary conflicts with a proper combination of conventional and unconventional forms and methods of warfare. The logic of this emphasis is situated within the historical context of the Russian military reform that has been ongoing since 2008. The reform aimed to structurally reorganize the Russian Armed Forces after its poor performance in the Russo-Georgian War. The first stage of the reform was conducted under the guidance of the previous Minister of Defense, Anatoliy Serdyukov. It aimed at the “optimization” of the Russian Armed Forces but ended up with a drastic reduction of the number of Russian Armed Forces, the dissolution of military academia, and a series of major corruption scandals in the Ministry of Defense. Because of this scandal in late 2012, Sergei Shoigu was appointed as the new Minister of Defense, and Valery Gerasimov was appointed to his position in the General Staff. Therefore, this article is a statement by a newly appointed Chief of General Staff, who presented his views and outlined the tendencies along which the Russian military should continue the modernization process.
The reception of Gerasimov’s article is of particular interest, as it came under the scrutiny of Western academic and military analysts within the context of rising geopolitical tensions and renewed interest in Russia’s military thinking. It was translated into English in June 2014, as Russia was waging the war in Ukraine, and later was published in the U.S. Army journal Military Review in 2016, as Russia was already deployed in Syria. Within analytical discourse, Gerasimov’s article had been used as a point of reference to understand the principles of Russia’s foreign policy, particularly concerning its military presence in the two abovementioned conflicts. The article became treated as the foundational document of the so-called “Gerasimov Doctrine.” This term was made up by Western analysts to refer to something of a distinct Russian strategy of hybrid warfare, which it was conducting against the West. The term has been criticized as inaccurate oversimplification, which made up a fully-fledged doctrine from a brief outline of present trends in military theory.
However, the article is an important milestone of Russian military thought throughout the 2010s. It allows us to grasp the thinking of the Russian political-military establishment, which sought to expand the potential policy options by utilizing its military potential as an instrument to pursue its political and strategic goals. The article essentially represents contemporary currents of military thinking, within which warfare increasingly becomes “hybrid,” incorporating a wide range of non-military methods. Although the article should not be treated as an actual blueprint for the invasion of Ukraine, it nevertheless outlines the main principles along which the Russian aggression in Ukraine had been unfolding, particularly during its 2014-2022 “hybrid” phase.
Author of the reflection: Maksym Soklakov, IUFU Student
Reviewing and editing: Tetiana Zemliakova, Denys Tereshchenko
